The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism
Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387 (2013)
Abstract
A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.
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2013
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References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Scanlon, Thomas
Knowledge in a Social World.Goldman, Alvin I.
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Kvanvig, Jonathan L.
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest
Warrant and Proper Function.Plantinga, Alvin
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Citations of this work BETA
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Dorst, Kevin
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Carr, Jennifer Rose
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Littlejohn, Clayton
The Aptness of Anger.Srinivasan, Amia
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Silva Jr, Paul
View all 44 citations / Add more citations
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2013-06-12
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2013-06-12
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39 ( #15,955 of 50,109 )
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