The Unity of Grounding

Mind 127 (507):729-777 (2018)
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Abstract
I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.
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First archival date: 2014-08-22
Latest version: 4 (2015-08-05)
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2014-08-22

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