Assessment Sensitivity about Future Contingents, Vindication and Self-Refutation


John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism – Assessment Sensitivity – provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: statements about the future that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and solves the puzzle, Assessment Sensitivity is ultimately self-refuting

Author Profiles

Corine Besson
University of Sussex
Anandi Hattiangadi
Stockholm University


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