Knowledge of logical generality and the possibility of deductive reasoning

In Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.), Inference and consciousness. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 172-196 (2019)
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Abstract
I address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles in deductive reasoning and defuses the threat to a cognitivist account of knowing basic logical principles.
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Archival date: 2020-02-04
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