Moral intuitionism and disagreement

Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789 (2014)
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Abstract
According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed moral beliefs. However, it is implausible to think that commonplace disagreement seriously undermines moral knowledge, and thus it is implausible to think that the standard account of moral intuitionism is true
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First archival date: 2014-02-11
Latest version: 2 (2014-02-22)
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Moral Realism: A Defence.Shafer-Landau, Russ

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