On a Reflexive Case for Human Rights

Journal of East-West Thought 3 (4):51-64 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Can there be a "reflexive" or presuppositional, reasonably non-rejectable grounding of a Forst-type right to justification, or of a meaningful form of constitutive discursive standing? The paper argues that this is not so, and this for reasons that reflect more general limitations of presuppositional arguments for relevantly contested conclusions. To this end, the paper critically engages Forst's "reflexive" argument for human rights. It also considers O'Neill's presuppositional attempt to defend a form of cosmopolitanism, as well as the attempt to anchor constructivist conclusions in the meaning of the word "reasonable".

Author's Profile

Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University


Added to PP

382 (#33,764)

6 months
44 (#65,370)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?