Minimal Anti-Humeanism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):447-460 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue that this view has a variety of advantages that could make it attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations.
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BHOMA
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-10-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-10-17

Total views
357 ( #12,643 of 51,477 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
61 ( #8,586 of 51,477 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.