How to Refer: Objective Context vs. Intentional Context

In P. Blackburn, C. Ghidini, R. Turner & F. Giunchiglia (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context (Context'03), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 2680. Springer (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In "Demonstratives" Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by an act of demonstration, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context). Conversely in "After-thoughts" Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a directing intention (a feature of the intentional con-text). I present the two theories in competition and try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic rele-vance. My claim is that the analysis of demonstrative reference pro-vides a reliable test for our intuitions on the relation between objective and intentional context. I argue that the speaker's intentions can play a semantic role only if they satisfy an Availability Constraint: an inten-tion must be made available or communicated to the addressee, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the objective con-text. This thesis implies the reconciliation between "Demonstratives" and "Afterthoughts"

Author's Profile

Claudia Bianchi
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele (Milan)


Added to PP

953 (#14,074)

6 months
107 (#40,199)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?