Dretske and the causality of reasons

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In his work on reasons Dretske argues that reasons are only worthwhile for having them if they are causally relevant for explaining behaviour, which he elaborates in his representational theory of explanation. The author argues against this view by showing that there are reasons that are relevant for explaining behaviour but not causally relevant. He gives a linguistic foundation of his argumentation and shows that Dretske’s representational theory cannot explain human actions because man does not only perceive things that have already meaning but also assigns meanings to what (s)he perceives and that therefore reasons are fundamentally different from causes
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Archival date: 2012-10-26
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