Free Will and the Cross-Level Consequence Argument

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Abstract
Christian List has recently constructed a novel formal framework for representing the relationship between free will and determinism. At its core is a distinction between physical and agential levels of description. List has argued that, since the consequence argument cannot be reconstructed within this framework, the consequence argument rests on a ‘category mistake’: an illicit conflation of the physical and agential levels. I show that an expanded version of List’s framework allows the construction of a cross-level consequence argument.
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First archival date: 2020-11-17
Latest version: 4 (2020-11-25)
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2020-11-17

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