Dissertation, The University of Southampton (
2024)
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Abstract
This thesis is primarily an attempt at solving some issues in Schopenhauer’s theory of salvation. My aim is to
provide ways in which Schopenhauer’s soteriology could work. It is a partially reconstructive project in that
I will be bringing to the forefront some of Schopenhauer’s assertions at the expense of others. My aim is to
show that we are able to provide a much more cohesive and satisfying reading of Schopenhauer’s
philosophical project if we let go of some of the more orthodox assumptions in the Schopenhauer scholarship
– chief amoung these being that Schopenhauer is committed to the view that the will constitutes ultimate
reality. While this reading is a departure from the vast majority of the traditional readings of Schopenhauer’s
philosophy, I believe it has the twin advantages of both aligning Schopenhauer’s thought much closer with
the eastern traditions he believes his work is in sympathy with, and ultimately, providing a new platform from
which to assess the ‘traditional’ reading of Schopenhauer’s thought as ‘hopelessly pessimistic’. It is my
contention that while it remains true that Schopenhauer is very much a pessimist about the world as
manifested will, it is the perceived difficulties of his philosophy of salvation that have provided the most
significant road block preventing critics from seeing that there are dimensions to Schopenhauer’s thought
that cannot so easily be labelled as either pessimistic or optimistic. This thesis is an attempt to shed light on
possible new readings of Schopenhauer’s project in light of attempts to resolve issues in his soteriology.
I begin with the question – why do we need saving? I attempt to answer this through an analysis of
the terms ‘will’, ‘will-to-life’ and ‘affirmation and negation of the will-to-life’. Next, I attempt to argue that
the will should not be seen as ultimate reality in Schopenhauer’s system and that this is both closer to the
account which Schopenhauer himself was inclining towards later in his writings as well asa necessary sacrifice
in order to save Schopenhauer from more problematic inconsistencies.
I next attempt to solve inconsistencies in Schopenhauer’s account of personal identity. I argue that
there can only be a denial of the will-to-life if there is more to our identity than willing. I will also examine the
possibility of a denial of the will-to-life at all. I will be engaging with recent scholarship from Christopher
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Janaway on the possibility of negating the will-to-life and the implications of this for Schopenhauer’s account
of willing.
I will then attempt to resolve the on-going debate in the secondary literature concerning
Schopenhauer’s ethical pronouncements and his theory of the negation of the will-to-life. I will argue,
contrary to Sandra Shapshay and Tristan Ferrell, that it is possible to be one in whom the will has denied itself
while remaining one who wills ethically and that this can be the case if we focus our attention on what
Schopenhauer may truly mean by a compassionate will to help others.
Next, I will be asking why exactly it is good to be one in whom the will has denied itselfand what this
means for our understanding of value for the will-less subject.
Finally, I will be focusing on Schopenhauer’s pessimism and how a new reading of Schopenhauer’s
soteriology means that we can introduce new ways of assessing both the world as well as the place of
Schopenhauer’s philosophical system within it.
Ultimately, I will conclude that any interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy presents the
scholar with a choice and that we are subsequently only able to make new evaluative assessments on
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, as well push back against the charge that it is wholly pessimistic, if we choose to
accept major revisions to his metaphysics of the will. However, because Schopenhauer himself seemed to be
moving towards such revisions, we should not be afraid of doing so either.