Whose Metaethical Minimalism?

Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43 (2018)
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Abstract
T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way toward a satisfying non-reductive position in metaethics, one that embodies the ontological modesty that disavows any appeal to a ‘special metaphysical reality’ in Scanlon’s sense.
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2018
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0897-2346
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BIRWMM-2
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First archival date: 2018-07-18
Latest version: 2 (2018-11-18)
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2018-07-18

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