Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):339-349 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

Author Profiles

Lars Bo Gundersen
University of Aarhus

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-03

Downloads
796 (#25,994)

6 months
147 (#25,849)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?