Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):339-349 (2020)
Abstract
It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.
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BJEHKA
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Archival date: 2019-07-03
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2019-07-03
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175 ( #27,787 of 55,922 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #18,158 of 55,922 )
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