A Theory of Knowledge

Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (1993)
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In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw some epistemological and semantical consequences pertaining to such issues as the nature of epistemological justification, the Lottery Paradox, philosophical skepticism and the semantics of belief contexts.

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Frode Alfson Bjørdal
University of Oslo


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