All Properties are Divine or God exists

Logic and Logical Philosophy 3 (27):329-350 (2018)
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A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts `God’ allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not.
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