Humean cum Counterfactual Skepticism and Epistemological Deontologism

In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica, Vol .1: debates contemporâneos. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: pp. pp. 47-54 (2019)
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We present a strategy to avoid versions of Humean and counterfactual skepticism based upon a deontologist theory of justification, a partial guideline for how to side step Gettier problems for certain statements and the assumption that certain statements are compelling. As an upshot the threats of Humean skeptical arguments disappear for some subjects and classes of statements.
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