In Defense of Sensitivity

Synthese 154 (1):53-71 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision, we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BLAIDO-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-12
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
191 ( #22,748 of 51,210 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #43,095 of 51,210 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.