Schrödinger’s fetus examined

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Joona Räsänen has proposed a concept he calls Schrödinger’s Fetus as a solution to reconciling what he believes are two widely held but contradictory intuitions. I show that Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle, upon which Schrödinger’s Fetus is based, uses a more convincing account of personhood. I also argue that both Räsänen and Harman, by embracing animalism, weaken their arguments by allowing Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion into the frame.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BLASFE
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-14
View other versions
Added to PP
2019-12-14

Downloads
174 (#40,720)

6 months
21 (#40,020)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?