When propriety is improper

Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-11-22
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
295 ( #15,591 of 51,671 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #11,009 of 51,671 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.