Consciousness and accessibility

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598 (1990)
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Abstract
This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls an "access sense of consciousness." On my account there is no such sense."
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