Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox

Mind 129 (514):563-578 (2020)
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Abstract
Martin Smith has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and intriguing approach to puzzles and paradoxes in evidence law arising from the evidential standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence. According to Smith, the relation of normic support provides us with an elegant solution to those puzzles. In this paper I develop a counterexample to Smith’s approach and argue that normic support can neither account for our reluctance to base affirmative verdicts on bare statistical evidence nor resolve the pertinent paradoxes. Normic support is, as a consequence, not a successful epistemic anti-luck condition.
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First archival date: 2020-01-28
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