The folly of trying to define knowledge

Analysis 67 (3):214-219 (2007)
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The paper gives an a priori argument for the view that knowledge is unanalysable. To establish this conclusion I argue that warrant, i.e. the property, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief, entails both truth and belief and thus does not exist as a property distinct from knowledge: all and only knowledge can turn a true belief into knowledge. The paper concludes that the project of trying to find a condition distinct from knowledge that is necessary and together with truth and belief sufficient for knowledge must be doomed to failure.
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Archival date: 2014-05-20
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