Team reasoning and collective moral obligation

Social Theory and Practice (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective.

Author Profiles

Olle Blomberg
University of Gothenburg
Björn Petersson
Lund University

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