Images, intentionality and inexistence

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):522-538 (2009)
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Abstract

The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.

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Ben Blumson
National University of Singapore

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