Mental Maps
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):413-434 (2012)
Abstract
It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.
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ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BLUMM-2
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Archival date: 2015-06-29
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
Total views
528 ( #10,837 of 2,440,222 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #18,634 of 2,440,222 )
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