Two Conceptions of Similarity

Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):21-37 (2018)
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Abstract

There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.

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Ben Blumson
National University of Singapore

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