Future Bias and Presentism

In Per Hasle, Peter Øhrstrøm & David Jakobsen (eds.), The Metaphysics of Time: Themes from Prior. Aalborg: pp. 281-297 (2020)
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Abstract
Future-biased agents care not only about what experiences they have, but also when they have them. Many believe that A-theories of time justify future bias. Although presentism is an A-theory of time, some argue that it nevertheless negates the justification for future bias. Here, I claim that the alleged discrepancy between presentism and future bias is a special case of the cross-time relations problem. To resolve the discrepancy, I propose an account of future bias as a preference for certain tensed truths properly relativized to the present.
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First archival date: 2020-12-23
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