Proper Function and the Conditions for Warrant: What Plantinga’s Notion of Warrant Shows about Different Kinds of Knowledge

Philosophia Christi 14 (2):373-386 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant and Proper Function gives two major definitions of warrant. One states that reliable cognitive faculties aimed at true belief and functioning properly in the right environment are necessary and sufficient for warrant; the other definition only states that they are necessary. The latter definition is the more important one. There are different kinds of knowledge, and justification is necessary for some beliefs to be warranted. Even a belief warranted by proper function can receive a higher degree of warrant by justification. This implies that natural theology has a useful role within the contours of a Plantingian epistemology. (Please note that the pagination here does not match the pagination in the published edition.)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-02-13
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
167 ( #39,762 of 70,017 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #32,594 of 70,017 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.