Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack details present in clear experiences. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that do not, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a change in content. This applies to perceptual distortions due to blur, double vision, perspective, and illumination conditions.
Reprint years
2015
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BOUAGR
Revision history
First archival date: 2012-11-01
Latest version: 7 (2014-11-12)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness and Intentionality.Mendelovici, Angela & Bourget, David

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-11-01

Total views
1,327 ( #1,319 of 42,235 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #5,197 of 42,235 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.