Is Narrow Content's "Narrow Content" Narrow Content?

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Abstract
In their monograph Narrow Content, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne argue that all versions of internalism about mental content are either false or "pointless" (roughly, of no interest). We overview Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne's main line of argument and suggest that, while largely correct, it does not touch the core internalist claim that mental states have internally determined contents. Instead of engaging with this claim, Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne attack a variety of stronger or weaker claims. The stronger claims fall prey to the Mirror Man argument and other considerations. The weaker claims fall prey to the charge of pointlessness. But the core internalist view is left untouched.
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First archival date: 2022-05-09
Latest version: 3 (2022-05-09)
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2022-05-09

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