Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction

Synthese 194 (10):4065-4081 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The paper critically examines recent work on justifications and excuses in epistemology. I start with a discussion of Gerken’s claim that the “excuse maneuver” is ad hoc. Recent work from Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn provides resources to advance the debate. Focusing in particular on a key insight in Williamson’s view, I then consider an additional worry for the so-called excuse maneuver. I call it the “excuses are not enough” objection. Dealing with this objection generates pressure in two directions: one is to show that excuses are a positive enough normative standing to help certain externalists with important cases; the other is to do so in a way that does not lead back to Gerken’s objection. I show how a Williamson-inspired framework is flexible enough to deal with both sources of pressure. Perhaps surprisingly, I draw on recent virtue epistemology.
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BOUENA
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-12-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-06-01

Total views
170 ( #35,858 of 65,613 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #30,178 of 65,613 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.