Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions

Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530 (2017)
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This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
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First archival date: 2016-08-15
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