Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (12):17--42 (2004)
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Abstract
I discuss the quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and freewill offered by Stapp (1993, 1995, 2000, 2004). First I show that decoherence-based arguments do not work against this theory. Then discuss a number of problems with the theory: Stapp's separate accounts of consciousness and freewill are incompatible, the interpretations of QM they are tied to are questionable, the Zeno effect could not enable freewill as he suggests because weakness of will would then be ubiquitous, and the holism of measurement in QM is not a good explanation of the unity of consciousness for essentially the same reason that local interactions may seem incapable of accounting for it.
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First archival date: 2008-06-06
Latest version: 10 (2015-01-30)
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Consciousness Explained.DENNETT, Daniel C.
Do We Have Free Will?Libet, Benjamin W.

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2009-01-28

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