Tracking Representationalism

In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235 (2014)
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Abstract
This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism
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2014
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First archival date: 2012-12-23
Latest version: 6 (2015-03-05)
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References found in this work BETA
Knowing One's Own Mind.Davidson, Donald

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Phenomenal Intentionality.Bourget, David & Mendelovici, Angela

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2012-12-24

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