The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.

Author's Profile

David Bourget
University of Western Ontario


Added to PP

2,938 (#1,861)

6 months
183 (#7,948)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?