The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

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Abstract
One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.
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2015, 2017
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BOUTRO-11
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First archival date: 2015-06-26
Latest version: 4 (2015-07-10)
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References found in this work BETA
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness Explained.DENNETT, Daniel C.
What Do Philosophers Believe?Bourget, David & Chalmers, David J.
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest

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2015-06-26

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