The Fine-Tuning Argument Against the Multiverse

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead.

Author Profiles

Philip Swenson
William & Mary
Kenneth Boyce
University of Missouri, Columbia

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