The semantic insignificance of referential intentions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):125-135 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that none of the speaker's referential intentions accompanying his utterance of a demonstrative are semantically significant but rather the associated demonstration (or some other source of salience). It is constitutive of the speaker's having the specifically referential intention - held by Kent Bach to be semantically significant - that the speaker is taking, and relying upon, his accompanying gesture (or some other source of salience) as semantically significant, making it the case that this intention is not even partly semantically significant. The same is then shown to hold for the speaker's remaining referential intentions: his intention aimed at a perceived object, believed by David Kaplan to be semantically significant, as well as the intention to refer to the object that he has in mind.

Author's Profile

Vojislav Bozickovic
Univerzitet u Beogradu

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
445 (#33,964)

6 months
107 (#31,208)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?