A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems

Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393 (2014)
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The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.

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Darren Bradley
University of Leeds


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