Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief

Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRAFPA
Upload history
First archival date: 2011-01-25
Latest version: 2 (2016-02-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
848 ( #5,606 of 2,439,437 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #23,762 of 2,439,437 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.