On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings"

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain where, in my view, each goes wrong
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRAOSW
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-03-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-03-17

Total views
504 ( #12,119 of 2,448,303 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #18,717 of 2,448,303 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.