Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning

Mind 129 (514):579-584 (2020)
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Abstract
Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for conditionalization. Miriam Schoenfield offers a solution: that on learning E, agents should update on the fact that they learned E. However, Schoenfield is not explicit about whether the fact that they learned E is self-locating. I will argue that if the fact that they learned E is self-locating then the original problem has not been addressed, and if the fact that they learned E is not self-locating then the theory generates implausible verdicts which Schoenfield explicitly rejects.
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Archival date: 2018-07-03
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