The Experience Machine
Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145 (2016)
Abstract
In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being
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2015-10-19
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814 ( #2,364 of 39,588 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
172 ( #2,039 of 39,588 )
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