The Experience Machine
Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145 (2016)
Abstract
In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-beingAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/phc3.12303
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2015-10-19
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2015-10-19
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434 (#828)
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