The Experience Machine

Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145 (2016)
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In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being
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First archival date: 2015-10-18
Latest version: 2 (2016-03-13)
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Well-Being: Reality's Role.Forcehimes, Andrew T. & Semrau, Luke

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