Whole-Life Welfarism

American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74 (2014)
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In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.

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Ben Bramble
Australian National University


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