Existential Instantiation, Arbitrary Reference and Supposition

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Existential instantiation is a rule of inference that allows us infer, from the proposition that there are some p things, the proposition that a is a p thing. What role does 'a' play here? According to one account, recently defended by Breckenridge and Magidor, we use 'a' to refer to a p thing. I argue that this cannot be right. I propose an alternative account, according to which we use 'a' to refer to a supposedly p thing.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BREEIA-5
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
.van Inwagen, Peter
Arbitrary Reference.Breckenridge, Wylie & Magidor, Ofra
Creatures of Fiction.van Inwagen, Peter

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-06-04

Total views
81 ( #36,388 of 50,406 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #28,453 of 50,406 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.