Easy ontology, application conditions and infinite regress

Analysis 78 (4):605-614 (2018)
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Abstract
In a number of recent publications Thomasson has defended a deflationary approach to ontological disputes, according to which ontological disputes are relatively easy to settle, by either conceptual analysis, or conceptual analysis in conjunction with empirical investigation. Thomasson’s “easy” approach to ontology is intended to derail many prominent ontological disputes. In this paper I present an objection to Thomasson’s approach to ontology. Thomasson’s approach to existence assertions means that she is committed to the view that application conditions associated with any term “K” with non-trivial application conditions must refer to the existence of things other than Ks. Given other components of her meta-ontological scheme, this leads to either an infinite regress or circularity of application conditions, both of which seem objectionable. Accordingly, some part of Thomasson’s meta-ontological scheme should be modified or abandoned.
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Archival date: 2018-07-26
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References found in this work BETA
Easy Ontology Without Deflationary Metaontology.Daniel Z. Korman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Ordinary Objects.Thomasson, Amie
Towards Ontological Nihilism.O'Leary-Hawthorne, John & Cortens, Andrew
The Things We Mean.Schiffer, Stephen

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2018-07-25

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