Cosmological Argument and Ontological Dependence

In Fábio Bertato, Nicola Claudio Salvatore & Marcin Trepczyński (eds.), Coleção CLE - Vol 94 - Themes in Philosophy of Religion. pp. 170-192 (2023)
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Abstract

The interest for versions of cosmological argument formulated in non-causal terms had increased in the last years. In this paper I shall argue that the cosmological argument of contingency is better understood in noncausal terms and I shall explore how the ontological dependence of the universe on God presupposed by this cosmological argument can be understood in terms of the identityessential account for ontological dependence championed by Kit Fine. First, I discuss the reasons for considering that the cosmological argument of contingency is about constant or constitutive ontological (noncausal) dependence. Second, I present the essentialist account of ontological dependence by Kit Fine. Third, I examine the perplexities involving the ontological argument of contingency in the framework of identity-essential dependence. My conclusion is that, under the cosmological argument of contingency plus an identity-essential account of ontological dependence, all contingent things depend on God in a collective way, not an individual one. The collective essence of the totality of contingent things requires God, even although none of these things individually need to have God in their individual essences.

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