The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language

Kluwer Academic Publishers (1997)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The first part of the book constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I'. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses an individual concept with two components: the de re sense and a context-independent, fundamental self-concept. By interacting with the environment the subject forms belifs about herself that are essentially first-personal. To have a full-blown self-consciousness and be a competent speaker of 'I', the subject must be able to connect these indexical beliefs with general ones and thus conceive of herself as part of the objective order. The use of 'I' moreover presupposes unity of consciousness and identity over time on the part of the speaker
ISBN(s)
0792347412 (hb : alk. paper)  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRITII-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-10-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Why Semantic Unspecificity is Not Indexicality.Delia Belleri - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):56-69.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-02-13

Total views
79 ( #29,586 of 42,917 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #32,877 of 42,917 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.