The Real Truth About the Unreal Future
In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7 (2012)
Abstract
Growing-Block theorists hold that past and present things are real, while future things do not yet exist. This generates a puzzle: how can Growing-Block theorists explain the fact that some sentences about the future appear to be true? Briggs and Forbes develop a modal ersatzist framework, on which the concrete actual world is associated with a branching-time structure of ersatz possible worlds. They then show how this branching structure might be used to determine the truth values of future contingents. They point out three different ways of interpreting the logical connectives, which give rise to three different logics of the open future: one supervaluationist, one corresponding to Lukasiewicz's strong Kleene logic, and one intuitionist.
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Against Non‐Ludovician Time.Pezet, Robert E.
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