Berkeley, Newton, Explanation, and Causation

Ruch Filozoficzny 74 (4):21 (2019)
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Abstract
Berkeley, Newton, Explanation, and Causation I argue in this paper that Berkeley’s conception of natural law explanations, which echoes Newton’s, fails to solve a fundamental problem, which I label “explanatory asymmetry"; that the model of explanation Berkeley uses fails to distinguish between explanations and justifications, particularly since Berkeley denies real (efficient causes) in non-minded nature. At the end I suggest Berkeley might endorse a notion of understanding, say in astronomy or mechanics, which could be distinguished from explanation.
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Archival date: 2019-12-08
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2018-12-29

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