Categorically Perceiving Motor Actions

In Daniel Weiskopf (ed.), Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. pp. 465-482 (2020)
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Abstract

In this chapter, I will present an empirical conjecture to the effect that some bodily actions are categorically perceived. These are bodily actions such as grasping or reaching for something, which I am going to call motor actions. My conjecture builds on one recently put forward about how the categorical perception of facial expressions of some emotions works. I shall motivate my own conjecture on the basis of both theoretical and empirical considerations, describe how it could be operationalised and what explanatory gain could be obtained from it.

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Chiara Brozzo
Universitat de Barcelona

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